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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF TiiE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MER\VYN L. WILKINSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH; GARRETT FREIGHT-
LINES, INC., and TRUCK INSUR-
ANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendants, and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11814 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Plaintiff has appealed from the Order of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying the 
Plaintiff's application for benefits under the \Vork-
men's Compensation Act of the State of Utah. The 
Order of the Commission found that the applicant 
was not in the course of his employment at the time 
of the accident complained of by the Plaintiff and 
therefore was not entitled to recover compensation 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State 
of Utah. 
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DISPOSITION BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission held that the appli-
cant was not acting in the course of his employment 
at the time the accident occurred and therefore his 
application was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS 
Defendants submit that the decision of the In-
dustrial Commission should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff was injured as he was driving 
his motorcycle on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, after leaving the premises of his 
employer, the Defendant Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 
whose place of business is located on the west side 
of Redwood Road at about 50 South. The accident 
occurred on September 7, 1967, at about 4 :15 p.m. 
The Plaintiff was struck by an automobile which 
was southbound on Redwood Road (R. 167-169). 
The Plaintiff was attempting to make a left turn to 
go north on Redwood Road. Redwood Road, other-
wise known as 16th West, runs north and south in 
Salt Lake City. 
The Plaintiff was employed by Garrett Freight-
lines, Inc. as a driver on the "extra board." A driver 
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\\·ho is on the extra board, when he comes in from 
run. places his name at the bottom of the extra 
1oarcl list and he is called for work when needed. 
BPing on the extra board, he had no regular nm but 
went any place in the area serYiced by the Defend-
;111t Garrett Freightlines, Inc. when called up for 
\\·m·k by his employer. The extra board driYers are 
called up in rotation. 
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. had an agreement 
with the Teamsters Local Union that required Gar-
rett's to give its drivers on the extra board an alert 
call between the hours of 5 :00 p.m. and 7 :00 p.m., 
following which a firm call to report for work was 
giYen two hours prior to departure time (R. 172). 
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. neither requested nor en-
couraged the Plaintiff to personally call at their 
dispatch office on the day of the accident or at any 
other time (R. 111-112). 
On the day of the accident the Plaintiff called 
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. and talked with Jack 
Christensen, the terminal manager, and told Mr. 
Christensen that he would call in at 5 :30 p.m. (R. 
109 and R. 46-48). This was done to protect his 
position on the f'xtra board. 
The Plaintiff was not being paid at the time 
the accident occurred and his pay would not have 
commenced until some six hours later when he should 




PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN THE 
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
A. THE \VAS ON HIS OWN AT 
THE TLME HE \VAS INJURED. 
The e\·idencc is clear that the Plaintiff at the 
time he met with his accident was on his way home. 
He was not coming to or going from work at the 
time. The occasion of his being where the accident 
occu1Ted was of his own Yolition and did not in any 
way further or aid his employer's work. Garrett 
Freightlines, Inc. ga\·e no directions or instructions 
to the Plaintiff to report to their place of business 
or to do \vhat he did, but on the contrary had made 
specific arrangements with the union as to how and 
when the dri\·ers, including the Plaintiff herein, 
were to be notified as to \vhether they would be 
used and when to report to work. 
Jack Stanley Christensen, terminal manager 
for c;aiTPt t Freightlines, Inc., testified as follows: 
"Q. was Mr. \Yilkinson requested by 
y1m. 01· anyone in you1· company, to report in 
person eal'lic1· that day? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you require your employees to re-
port in person? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. is the procedure, quickly, as to 
tlw calling of men who an· on the extra board? 
A. \Yell, beginning at anv particular 
point? 
Q. Yes. Just so that the record is clear as 
to how this works. 
THE REFEREE: \Yell, let's put it this 
way, to save time: Is there anv substantial 
variation in the way Mr. \Yilkinson and the 
previous witness Mr. Stoddard, have testified 
i·egarding the operation of the extra board? 
Is that in substance the way it operates? 
THE \VITNESS: \Yell, I could only add 
one thing, Mr. Examiner. There was quite an 
emphasis made on the fact that they were 
required to be on call all the time. And this 
is the very purpose of the rules that we have, 
so that they aren't required to be on call all 
the time. But, in substance, they're correct. 
THE REFEREE: I see." (IL 111-112). 
B. THE PLAINTIFF HAD KO VALID TO 
GO TO GARRETT'S AT 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
The plaintiff was rmployecl as an extra board 
driver. He could, after signing in on the extra board 
upon completing his last run. ascertain how many 
drivers \\·ere ahead of him and \Yhen he might again 
be used by his employer. He would hm·e been on 
alert after receiving a call from the dispatcher, and 
being advised that he would be used. 
The usual time for extra board drivers to leave 
the employer's place of business on a "run" is late 
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in the evening. \Vilkinson was not requi1·ed to re-
port in person to his employer to make himself avail-
able for work. The nonnal procedure was for the 
dispatcher to call the dri,·ern on the telephone. The 
union contract required the dispatcher to place an 
alert call between the hours of five and seven in 
the evening, or if the employee knows that he will 
not be available during those hours then it is to 
the advantage of the employee to call and give the 
dispatcher information as to whether he will be avail-
able and where he would be at a certain hour. In 
this respect see the testimony of Milton R. Stoddard, 
a driver employee of Garrett Freightlines, Inc. 
called by the Plaintiff ( R. 26). 
"Q. Would you please describe for the 
record what the extra board is? 
A. "\Vell, it's a rotating board that takes 
care of anyone that's on vacation or cancels 
out. They're called to pull extra runs, extra 
divisions, or extra sleepers. 
Q. Are the men called according to the 
business needs of Garrett Freightlines? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhen a driver on extra board finishes 
a run, what does he usually do with respect to 
the board? 
A. You just sign the bottom of the board, 
and as it rotates to the top he's called. 
Q. During what hours of the day can an 
extra board driver be called? 
A. Anytime. 
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. Q. He can be called anytime, anytime dur-
ing the 24-hour period. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much notice is he giYen? 
A. Two hours. 
Q. Now, if you're subject 1:-0 a 24-hour 
call, as an extra board driver, how does a 
driver know approximately when he will have 
to drive again? 
A. Well, after you've been on the board a 
little while, you can tell fairly close. Like you 
get up at seven or eight in the morning, and 
you want to know whether you got the day 
off, you usually call in, and the dispatcher 
will tell you approximately what time 1:-0 call 
back or check with him. Or he'll tell you that 
you're far enough down the board, they won't 
need you, and not to bother with them and 
they'll call you during the regular dispatch 
hours, five to seven at night. And, therefore, 
you have a day off, in other words." (R. 26-
27). 
Mr. Christensen, the manager of Garrett 
Freightlines, testified as to the procedure followed 
as a result of an agreement with the union in respect 
to calling men on the extra board for work. 
"Q. And then the dispatcher has the re-
sponsibility of making the telephone calls 1:-0 
alert these people; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After they have made an alert 
what then does the dispatcher do. Presummg 
that he made an alert call for this 10 :00 o'clock 
trip, what other calls would he make? 
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A. \Vell, he would call at 8 :00 o'clock and 
give the ch·iver a firm call to report at 10 ·oo 
, 1 l . 0 C10C \. 
Q. So there are t\vo l'.alls; is that right? 
A. There could be two calls. 
Q. And one is called an alert call, and 
that's between six and eight, I mean - yes 
bet\veen six and eight; is that right? ' 
A. \V ell, the call between four and six -
Q. I see. 
A. - is an alert call. 
Q. That's to do what. 
A. That notifies or alerts all drivers that 
are going to be used between that time and 
7 :00 o'clock the following morning. 
Q. That merely tells them that they're go-
ing to be called sometime that evening; is that 
right? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. And then the next call is made when? 
A. Two hours prim· to the departure time. 
1\ow, rm speaking of the time between 7 :00 
at night, or 6 :00 o'clock at night and 
7 :0() o'clock in the morning. 
Q. Then they're given the two hours' no-
tification, and time to get ready to come; is 
that rigi1t? 
A. Right. 
l\IR. \\.ELCH: Does that clear that up, 
11r. Shaughnessy? 
THE REFEREE: Just one question in 
this area: \Voulcl .Ml'. \Vilkinson have received 
a call between fou1· and six? 
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THE \\'IT NESS: He would haYe. You 
mean had he not -
THE REFEREE: Had he not been in-
jured? 
THE \VITNESS: Yes, uh huh. 
THE REFEREE: And this would have 
advised him that sometime after 7 :00 o'clock 
p.m. he would receive an alert call; or that 
is, a call for work. ' 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, uh huh. 
THE REFEREE: And then he normally 
would have been called at 8 :00 o'clock, then, 
to report for work by ten. 
THE WITNESS: This is correct." ( R. 
116-118). 
See also the agreement with the union (R. 172). 
Milton R. Stoddard, called on behalf of the Plain-
tiff, testified as follows regarding the procedure 
followed by drivers on the "extra board." 
"Q. Now, there is no requirement that you 
men on the extra board, or men on the extra 
board, come in personally to report to the Gar-
rett Freightlines depot there, is there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. No requirement, at all. 
A. (Witness shakes head in the negative.) 
Q. Now, the normal procedure is through 
the telephone call; is that right? 
A. That's what everybody usually uses, 
yes. 
Q. And isn't it normal procedure also for 
those on the extra board to, if they're not 
going to be available by the telephone two 
hours before they're about to go out, or be-
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tween the hours of - what is it four to six 
when they make their call? ' 
When do they make their call the dis-
patchers make their call? ' 
A. They call your sleepers between four 
and six, and the extra board between five and 
seven. 
Q. All right. 
Now, if you are on the extra board, then 
and if you are not going to be available at 
your home or residence, or wherever, between 
five and seven, what is your general practice? 
A. Usually to call them. 
Q. Call them on the phone and let them 
know when you'll call in'! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you leave the message that you'll 
call in, or you'll be at a certain place at a cer-
tain hour; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you call in and leave that mes-
sage, and is that written on this extra board 
sheet? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. And then that message gets to whom? 
A. Just a second. I'll take that back. It 
is. Usually if you call the regular dispatcher, 
and leave a number, it's written on there, to 
where they can get ahold of you. 
Q. Where they can get in touch with you 
on what you are going to do. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Whether you're going to call in or 
whether they're going to call you; is that 
right? 
· . Y '>. sir. 
11 
Q. And so then if that is done, then there'd 
be no reason for anyone to come in, because 
that call would be made at that point· is that 
right? ' 
A. Yes, sir, that's right." (R. 46-48). 
The Plaintiff made a telephone call to the termi-
nal manager, Mr. Christensen, earlier in the day of 
the accident and in substance ad,·ised that he would 
not be available until "1730" when he would again 
call. His testimony as to the call and as to not being 
required to report in person was as follows: 
"Q. And did you tell them that you would 
call back at 1730? 
A. I well could have. 
Q. And what does "1730" mean? 
A. 5 :30 in the evening. 
Q. 5 :30 in the evening? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, then you did notify them that 
you would call at that time; is that right? 
A. That or before. At least no later than 
that, yes. 
Q. Now, you were not asked to come in 
personally, were you? 
A. Never asked to come in personally, no. 
Q. Or you were never told to come in per-
sonally, were you? 
A. Only to pull my trips. 
Q. All right. . 
But I mean you were not told to come m 
personally, and report in -
A. No. . . h 
Q. - or to check out your pos1t10n on t e 
extra board. 
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A. No. I was never told to report, and I 
was never told I couldn't. So I did both. 
Q And on that day, the same thing is true 
on that particular day. 
A. Yes. (R. 87-88). 
The Referee questioned the Plaintiff relative 
to the telephone call he made and he asked in conclu-
sion the following question and received the follow-
ing answer: 
"THE REFBREE: Then it's fair to as-
sume that somebody wrote that on there pur-
suant to your telephone call that you would 
check back at 1730? 
THE WITNESS: I would say that's what 
it's from, yes." (R.96-97). 
The record is clear that the Plaintiff did call 
in and had protected his place on the extra boara; 
nevertheless, on his own volition, he entered Gar-
rett's at 4 :00 p.m. 
Mr. Larry Donald Hollis, dispatcher, who was 
on duty at the time the accident occurred, testified 
on direct and cross-examination that at 4 :00 or 4 :15 
p.m., which was just after he reported for duty, that 
he would not know for sure whether Mr. Wilkinson 
would be called because he first had to call out all 
.;leeper drivers between the hours of 4 :00 p.m. and 
6 :00 p.m. and that he would not know how many 
extra board men the company was going to use until 
all the sleeper drivers had been called. The sleeper 
drivers are men on bid trucks. After that the extra 
board men are called (R. 131-132). 
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The substance of Mr. Hollis' testimony is that 
at 4 :00 p.m. when Wilkinson came into his dispatch 
office all he could have told him \Vas that he would 
probably be used that evening. The dispatcher did 
not know at the time Mr. Wilkinson went to the 
dispatcher's office for certain when or how Mr. \Vil-
kinson would be used. It was too early for the dis-
patcher to determine these facts. Therefore, no use-
ful purpose was served by Wilkinson making a per-
sonal call at the dispatcher's office at the time he 
made the call. This is especially in Yiew of the fact 
that he had earlier called Mr. Jack Christensen and 
had indicated to him that he would call in at 5 :30 
p.m. because by that time the dispatcher would have 
known whether for certain Mr. Wilkinson would 
be used and where he would be going. 
The record is clear that Mr. Wilkinson went to 
Garrett's on his own volition. No advantage was 
gained thereby either to himself or to his employer. 
Nothing was gained or could have been gained by 
the Plaintiff's appearance at his employer's place 
of business. 
C. NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF NOR THE DE-
FENDANT BENEFITTED FROM THE VISIT 
MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
Garrett's business was not aided by \Vilkinson 
driving his motorcycle into his employer's place of 
business at 4 :00 in the afternoon. At that time the 
dispatcher would not know what drivers might be 
needed. 
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In this connection Jack Stanley Christensen, on 
cross-examination, was asked the following ques-
tions: 
"Q. Could it have been possible that a dis-
patcher would have considered Mr. Wilkin-
son's visit the equal of an alert call? 
A. No. 
Q. Why it that? 
A. Because he wouldn't know at 4: 15 or 
4 :30 what the man was going to do or what 
even the dispatcher was going to do. (R. 122-
12:1). 
Further questioning of Mr. Christensen by 
Plaintiff's attorney revealed that no drivers had 
gone out by 4 :00 o'clock, that Keith Beale left at 
7 :00 o'clock in the evening; that Mr. Thiel left at 
9 :00 o'clock and the next one left at 10 :00 o'clock 
(R. 124). 
At that time in the afternoon Wilkinson was 
not benefitted as he could not have found out when 
he was going to go out, but he could only possibly 
have been advised by the dispatcher that he would 
go out that evening. However, this problem had 
already been met. The Plaintiff had called in earlier 
and had talked with Mr. Christensen on the tele-
phone advising that he would be available and that 
he would call in at 1730 or 5 :30 in the afternoon. 
15 
On direct examination Mr. Christensen testi-
fied as follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Welch) Now, Mr. Christen-
sen, in whose handwriting is that notation? 
A. That is mine. 
Q. And what was the occasion for you 
making that notation on that sheet? 
A. Well, Mr. Wilkinson called in and said 
that he would be available for work, and would 
not be available for work until 1730. 
Q. And was anything else said in that con-
versation? 
A. I don't remember the conversation. 
Q. And you made that notation at that 
time? 
MR. THOMPSON: Objection. 
A. Yes, I did. 
THE REFEREE : I think he can answer. 
This is a conversation you had with Mr. 
Wilkinson, I take it. Is that correct, Mr. 
Christensen? 
A. Yes, sir." (R. 110). 
The Plaintiff testified that it was the responsi-
bility of his employer through the dispatcher to call 
and give him an alert call between the hours of five 
and seven in the evening. 
"Mr. Welch: I am asking Mr. Wilkinson 
whether it is not true that the employer, 
through their dispatcher, is not required to 
give them a two-hour alert call between the 
hours of five and seven. 
Q. Is that right? . . 
A. Only if you are going out that evenmg. 
16 
Q. That's right. 
A. If they think -
Q. If you are going out that evening. 
A. If they think they want you. They still 
don't know, you understand. 
Q. And they're the ones that should make 
the call to you; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then if they know where you are, 
you have no responsibility for calling in to 
them, have you? 
A. If they know where you are? 
Q. Yes. So they can get in touch with you. 
A. That's right. 
Mr. Welch: That's all." (R. 101-102). 
The employer's business was not aided or en-
hanced by the Plaintiff going to Garrett's place of 
business at about 4 :00 o'clock in the afternoon. 
Neither was it necessary or helpful for Mr. Wilkin-
son, as he had previously telephoned and advised 
that he would call in at about 5 :30 p.m. Garrett's, 
therefore, knew that the Plaintiff would be available 
for work that evening. 
POINT II. 
GOING TO AND COMING FROM WORK IS 
NOT COVERED BY THE WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACT. 
Defendants take the position that in this case 
the Plaintiff was neither going to work nor coming 
from work; however, the general rule in this state 
is that under normal circumstances coming to and 
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going from work are not within the course of em-
ployment in the absence of a special mission. 
The rule was stated in Vitagraph, Inc., 'VS. Iri-
dustrial Commission, 85 P. 2d 601, 96 Utah 190, at 
603 P. 2d., the Court said: 
"It seems definitely settled that if a work-
man is injured in the normal course of things 
in going to or from his work or place of 
ployment, that is the result of the general 
hazards which all must meet and assume and 
is not in the course of his employment. Deri-
ver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 72 Utah 199, 269 P. 512, 62 
A.L.R. 1436; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Iri-
dustrial Cmnmission, 79 Utah 189, 8 P. 2d. 
617; Greer v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 
379, 279 P. 900. Such is what may be called 
the plant rule, where the employee does not 
attach himself to his employment until he 
arrives at the plant or locus of his work, and 
he is not in the employment after he leaves 
the plant or situs of his work." 
It is claimed by the Plaintiff that the circum-
stances under which he was injured were unusual 
and that he was subject to greater danger than was 
the general public. This we cannot agree to, because 
Redwood Road where the accident occurred is a 
street regularly traveled by the citizens of Salt Lake 
City. The dangers that he encountered as he entered 
Redwood Road on his motorbike were no more than 
the dangers encountered by any person using the 
said street. There was nothing to hinder the Plain-
18 
tiff's vision as he left the Garrett Freightlines yard, 
and the hazard which was his as he left the yard was 
common to all persons using Redwood Read. There 
was nothing in the risk which he took that was pecu-
liar to the Plaintff's employment and was not com-
mon to all persons using Redwood Road. 
In the case of Greer vs. State Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, 7 4 Utah 379, 279 P. 900, a carpen-
ter foreman was injured shortly bef01·e 8 :00 a.m. as 
he was on his way to work. This Court said at 279 
P. 901: 
"In this case the deceased was not injured 
while sharpening the saw at his home. The 
accident did not occur while he was actually 
engaged in the performance of a duty for the 
employer. The dangers of the street between 
his home and the stockyards were not incident 
to his employment, but were dangers common 
to all." (Emphasis ours.) 
Redwood Road is not inherently dangerous. Mr. 
Stoddard, the Plaintiff's witness, testified that he 
had parked in Garrett's parking lot for years; that 
there were three entrances to Garrett's place of busi-
ness wide enough to accommodate two vehicles; that 
he had never had any problem getting in or out; and 
that the only person he had known who had had 
trouble was Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. Stoddard was asked the following ques-
tions: 
"Q. Now, Garrett's is on the west side of 
the street, is that right? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. West side of Redwood Road. 
Aren't there, in fact, three entrances in 
and out of Garrett Freightlines' place of busi-
ness there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And these are gateways through the 
fence. 
A. There is no fence against the street. 
Q. No fence? 
A. No. 
Q. I see. 
They're actually entranceways, then, into 
Garrett's? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And each one of these entranceways 
are wide enough to accommodate two vehicles? 
A. Yes. The middle one is a wide, used 
for your trucks. And the two end ones are -
the one on the south end is usually just used 
by the men coming to work, and parking in 
the south part. But the main entrance is where 
most of the people turn in there. 
Q. And when you go in, as well as the 
other employees go in, you drive cars in there, 
do you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you park inside the Garrett 
lot? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you've done this for years? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You've never had any problem coming 
in or out? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you known of anybody that ever 
has had any problem coming in and out? 
A. Just one. 
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Q. And this is 1.Vlr. vVilkinson? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Other than that, the employees have 
been able to drive in or out whether they make 
a left-hand turn 01· right-hand turn· is that 
right? ' 
A. Yes, sir." (R. 50-51). 
The evidence is clear that there was no special 
problem or special dange1· involved in connection with 
one entering 01· leaving Garrett's place of business. 
Redwood Road is a road which presents no special 
problems to one entering the premises of Garrett 
Freightlines, Inc. or to the motoring public. 
The Plaintiff relies on two Utah cases, Cudahy 
Packing Cmnpany vs. Industrial Cmmnission, 60 
Utah 161, 207 P. 148 (1922), aff'd, Cudahy Packing 
Company vs. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153 
( 1923) and the case of Bountiful Brick Cmnpany 
vs. Industrial Comniission, 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555 
( 1926), aff'd, Bountiful Brick Cmnpany vs. Giles, 
276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221 (1928). These cases, 
however, can be distinguished from the case before 
the Court. 
In the Parramore case, the employee was struck 
100 feet from his employer's plant as he crossed a 
railroad track. He was on a county road which was 
the only means of access to the plant and which was 
kept under repair for persons traveling to and from 
the employer's plant. This is an entirely different 
factual situation from the present case in that the 
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employee was on his way to work when the accident 
occu1Ted and the county road was maintained for 
the benefit of Parramore's employer. The Plaintiff 
herein came to the employer's premises voluntarily 
and on his own initiative approximately four hours 
before he would normally be called to work. 
In the Bountiful Brick case the injured employee 
likewise was on his way to work, which is not true in 
the instant case, and likewise the injury occurred 
while the employee was crossing the railroad track 
adjacent to the employer's place of business. 
Plantiff's brief contains numerous references 
to cases from various parts of the United States 
which have held the employer liable for injury to 
employees when they were at or near the employer's 
place of business. However, a careful reading of all 
of these cases reveals that they involve employees 
going to or coming from work, which is not true in 
the instant case, and that the accidents most gener-
ally occurred upon or within property controlled or 
owned by the injured man's employer. None of these 
circumstances apply to the case before this Court. 
There is good reason for the rule that injuries 
received while coming to and going from work are 
not covered. Otherwise there would be no line of 
demarcation. If an employee should be covered for 
an accident occurring on a public street while he is 
either going to or coming from work it would be 
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just as logical to conclude that he should be covered 
for an injury received just as he left his home. 
Our discussion of the law relative to coming to 
and going from work should not be construed to be 
our belief that the case before the Court falls in that 
category. We take the position that the Plaintiff 
was neither coming to nor going from work, that 
what he did was entirely voluntary on his part, not 
necessary or required because of his employment. 
POINT III. 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION BASED UPON SUF-
FICIENT EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE OVER-
RULED. 
It has been said by the Supreme Court in num-
erous decisions that pursuant to Section 35-1-84, 
U.C.A., 1953, that only if the Industrial Commission 
arbitrarily disregards competent, uncontradicted 
evidence will the decision of the Commission be re-
versed. 
In Kent vs. Industrial C01nmission, 89 U. 381, 
57 P. 2d. 724 at 385 U. the Court said: 
"In the case of denial of compensation, the 
record must disclose that there is material, 
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evi-
dence sufficient to make a disregard of it jus-
tify the conclusion, as a matter of law that 
the Industrial Commission arbitrarily and 
capriciously disregarded the evidence or un-
reasonably refused to believe such evidence." 
23 
The Supreme Court held in Sutton, ewl. vs. 
Industrial Commission, 9 U. 2d. 339, 344 P. 2d 538, 
that there was no basis on which the Commission's 
action could be regarded as capricious, arbitrary or 
unreasonable when there was substantial, credible 
evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission. 
In Burton 'VS. Indiistrial Commission, 13 U. 2d. 
353, 37 4 P. 2d. 439, this Court said at 354 U.: 
"In order to reverse the finding and order 
made Plaintiff must show that there is such 
credible uncontradicted evidence in her favor 
that the Commission's refusal to so find was 
capricious and arbitrary." 
In the matter before this Court the Commission 
had substantial, uncontradicted testimony on which 
to make and enter its finding that the injuries sus-
tained by the Plaintiff Merwyn L. \Vilkinson did 
not arise out of or in the course of his employment 
with Garrett Freightlines, Inc. The facts are undis-
puted. The Plaintiff was not on an errand for his 
employer. He was neither going to or leaving work. 
He had no good reason to go to Garrett's on the 
afternoon the accident occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion Defendants submit that the deci-
sion of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed 
for the following reasons: 
1. That the accident sustained by the Plaintiff 
did not arise out of or in the course of his employ-
ment with the Defendant Garrett Freightlines, Inc. 
24 
2. That the Plaintiff at the time the accident 
occurred was not performing any duty that was 
beneficial to his employer or to himself inasmuch as 
his employer had already been contacted by the Plain-
tiff and was aware of the fact that he was available 
for work and that the Plaintiff would make a tele-
phone call at 5 :30 p.m. 
3. That the law is clear that one going to or 
corning from work is not covered under the Work-
men's Compensation Act of the State of Utah unless 
he is on a special mission for his employer at the 
time. The Plaintiff was not on a special mission 
for his employer at the time the accident occurred, 
but on his own volition went to his employer's place 
of business four hours prior to the time that he 
\vould have been called to report for work. 
4. That there was substantial and competent 
evidence to support the findings of the Industrial 
Commission. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
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